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NOTES
REAL ESTATE AS SECURITIES:
SALES OF RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISION LOTS
For the federal securities regulation statutes' to apply to the merits of
any case, the subject of the action must be a "security." 2 Identification
of securities can lead to seemingly esoteric results a Real property, for
example, generally is not a security,4 but sales of undeveloped subdivi-
1. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 1-26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (1976); Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, §§ 1-34, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1976).
2. For an excellent introduction to the definition of a "security," see Newton, What is a
Security.- A Critical Analsis, 48 Miss. L.J. 167 (1977). Two articles have become standard
guides on this issue: Hannan & Thomas, The Importance ofEconomic Reality andRisk in Defining
Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 219 (1974); Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Con-
tracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971). The definition of
"security" is developed at notes 16-51 infra and accompanying text.
For general studies of securities regulations, see L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (2d ed.
1961); D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION (1978).
3. The most unusual security case is Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466
(10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968), in which the court held a sale of live beavers to
be a sale of securities. See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (certain life
insurance policies); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable annuities);
Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976) (shares in dairy cattle operations); SEC v.
MacElvain, 417 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970) (sale of interest in
lawsuit); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assocs., 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973) (whiskey warehouse re-
ceipts); SEC v. Chinchilla, Inc., [1952-1956 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 90,618
(N.D. II1. 1953) (sale of chinchillas); SEC v. Cultivated Oyster Farms Corp., [1941-1944 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 90,121 (S.D. Fla. 1939) (sale of oysters); Longines
Symphonette Soc'y, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,151 (SEC No-
Action Letter) (commemorative medallion investment plans); U of F Students Coop., Inc., [1971-
1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,347 (SEC No-Action Letter) (consumer
cooperative memberships). See also 25 MERCER L. REV. 733 (1974) (whiskey warehouse receipts).
See also citations listed at I L. Loss, supra note 2, at 490 n.88 (2d ed. 1961); Hillard & Ric-
ciardelli, Investment Contracts Under the Colorado and Uniform Securities Acts, 49 COLO. L. REV.
391, 423 n.164 (1978). Trading stamps, street car tokens, meal tickets, gift certificates, box tops,
railroad tickets, and theater tickets are not securities. SEC Release No. 33-3890, 1 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1041 (Jan. 25, 1958).
4. One court set forth the general rule:
We agree that land, as such, is not a security and that a land purchase contract, simply
because the purchaser expects or hopes that the value of the land purchased will in-
crease, does not fall automatically within the confines of the Securities Acts. However,
we do not agree that land or its purchase necessarily negates the application of the Secur-
ities Acts.
McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 208 (10th Cir. 1975). Many courts have relied on Professor
Loss' analysis:
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sion lots may fall within the purview of securities statutes, depending
on the terms and circumstances of the sales.5
Most cases that apply the securities laws to sales of subdivision lots
have similar fact patterns. A developer subdivides a tract of unim-
proved land into residential lots. The price of each lot usually exceeds
the land's market value, but the developer promises that land values
will increase and that he will improve the subdivision. The buyers,
because of their distance from the property, are unable to inspect the
[N]o "investment contract" is involved when a person invests in real estate, with the
hope perhaps of earning a profit as the result of a general increase in values concurrent
with the development of the neighborhood, as long as he does not do so as part of an
enterprise whereby it is expressly or impliedly understood that the property will be de-
veloped or operated by others.
I L. Loss, supra note 2, at 491-92. See also United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310, 313
(S.D. Cal. 1975); SEC v. Thunderbird Valley, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D.S.D. 1973); Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure.Act: Hearings Before a Subcomm ofthe Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency on S. 2672, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1966) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chair-
man); Frauds and Quackery4ffecting the Older Citizen: Hearings Before the Special Senate Comm.
on Aging, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 486-87 (1963) (statement of William L. Cary, SEC Chairman).
5. See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d
204 (10th Cir. 1975); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Timmreck v.
Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,109 (D. Colo. 1976); Hester v. Hidden Valley Lakes, Inc., 404 F.
Supp. 580 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Bubula v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., No. 73 C 3131 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1974); Johnson v. Suburban
Land Inv. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,022 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973);
Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 687, 384 N.E.2d 981 (1978), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 272 (1979). References in this Note to "the subdivision cases" are references to these eleven
cases.
Two other cases deal only with lot purchasers' class actions under the federal securities regula-
tions. Gilbert v. Woods Marketing, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 745 (D. Minn. 1978); Tober v. Chartina,
Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1973). For a description of the possible significance of Tober, see
Tinmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. at 404 & n.6. Two other cases deal with transactions related to
sales of subdivision lots as securities. Chess v. Nieport, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,045 (E.D. Cal. 1974) (execution of promissory note and deed of trust is not a
"sale"); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972) (mortgages secured by
title to lots are securities (complete opinion reported at [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 93,348)). See also Fuls v. Shastina Properties, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (statute of limitations); McCubbrey v. Boise Cascade, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 93,414 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (suit filed). For an example of a case decided
under state securities statutes, see Florida Realty, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 509 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. 1974).
Many parties have litigated the applicability of securities regulations to sales of subdivision lots,
but only the cases listed above have resulted in written opinions. For an example of unreported
litigation, see Mancini v. GAC Corp., Civil No. 72-45-TUC-JAW (D. Ariz., fied Apr. 20, 1972).
Mancini is described in Hannan & Thomas, supra note 2, at 275-76 & nn.212-13 (1974).
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land or to oversee improvements.6 When the developer defrauds the
purchasers by not fulfilling his promises, the purchasers seek recovery
of damages.
Although damaged purchasers of subdivision lots may recover under
several legal theories,7 plaintiffs bringing actions under the securities
6. See also Hannan & Thomas, supra note 2, at 275-76.
7. Promoters of subdivision lot sales can be held liable in civil and criminal actions under
many theories if the sales are fraudulent. Possible theories, other than federal securities regulation
and common-law fraud, include: the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1720 (1976), providing civil and criminal causes of action and requiring registration for
sellers; Federal Trade Commission cease and desist orders; United States Postal Service actions
against use of mails to execute fraud; state securities regulations; and state statutes related specifi-
cally to subdivision lot sales.
See generally P. SIMKO, 3 PROMISED LANDS (1978); Babcock & Feurer, Land as a Commodity
"'Affected with a Public Interest," 52 WASH. L. REv. 289 (1977); Case & Jester, Securities Regula-
tion of Interstate Land Sales and Real Estate Development-A Blue Sky Administrator's Vi7ewpoint:
Part 1, 7 Ua. LAW. 385 (1975); Note, The Legislative Struggle Against Subdivision Frauds, 13
CATH. U.L. REv. 160 (1964); Note, Regulating the Subdivided Land Market, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1528 (1968); Note, Interstate Land Sales Regulation: The Casefor an Expanded Federal Role, 6 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 511 (1973); Note, Interstate Land Sales Regulation, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 123.
For an introductory analysis of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, see Morris, The
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act: Analysis and Evaluation, 24 S.C.L. REv. 331 (1972). For
criticism of the Act, see Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws,
71 COLUM. L. REv. 118, 123 (1971) ("relatively innocuous").
For analyses of state securities statutes as applied to real estate, see Hansell & Neumann, The
Iowa Uniform Securities Act Exemptions Part I: The Securities Exemptions, 2 J. CORP. L. 437
(1977); Hayes, The New Iowa "Uniform" Securities Law, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 267 (1975); Note,
State Securities Law: A Valuable Toolfor Regulating Investment Land Sales, 7 N.M.L. REv. 265
(1977). The real estate industry recently drafted the Federal Real Estate Securities Act and State
Uniform Real Estate Securities Act to broaden securities regulation liabilities. See Note, Shares in
Privately Financed Cooperative Apartment Corporations and the Federal Securities Law after
Grenader v. Spitz, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 432, 446-47 (1977).
For descriptions of state statutes exclusively regulating sales of subdivision lots, see Case &
Jester, supra, at 424-28 (Minnesota statute); 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 755 (1978) (Virginia Subdivided
Land Sales Act). For a table analyzing state regulation of land sales, see Note, "Rainbow City"-
The Needfor Federal Control in the Sale of UndevelopedLand, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 733, 758-59
(1971).
Despite diverse sources of possible regulation, many commentators insist that governmental
regulation of real estate is inadequate. See Babcock & Feurer, supra, at 334.
Some sellers in the eleven subdivision cases, see note 5 supra, were challenged under other
theories in separate litigation. See Waugh v. Heidler, 564 P.2d 218 (Okla. 1977) (possible liability
under states securities regulations); United States v. Amrep Corp., 560 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1977)
(liability for mail fraud and under antifraud provisions of Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v. Goldberg, 527 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1975),
(same), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1978); Bryon v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(same); Husted v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (liability under anti-fraud
provisions of Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act). See also Heit v. Amrep Corp., 82 F.R.D.
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (approving settlements).
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statutes have particular advantages. The securities statutes permit
plaintiffs to bring actions in a wide range of federal district courts8 and
to recover damages plus interest.9 Moreover, the concept of "fraud"
under the securities laws embraces a broader range of activities than
under the common law,'0 and pendent jurisdiction enables plaintiffs to
assert both theories in federal court."
This Note examines a series of cases that apply federal securities
laws to sales of subdivision lots. Part I presents a brief introduction to
federal securities regulation and to the definition of "security." Part II
reviews the application of the standard "security" definition to subdivi-
sion lots. Part III then discerns an analytic framework to determine
whether sales of subdivision lots constitute securities transactions.
I. SECURITIES REGULATION: PURPOSES AND DEFINITIONS
The principal purposes of security regulation statutes are to prevent
fraud and to compel full disclosure of information in securities transac-
tions.' 2 Congress enacted the earliest of the federal statutes in 1933,13
commencing a series of changes in the securities market to provide in-
vestors with more protection from fraud than either the common law or
state statutes afforded.' 4 The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provide liberal remedies for fraud in securities
sales. '-
8. See Securities Act of 1933, § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976).
9. Id. § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77L
10. See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1421-528. The federal securities statutes, for
example, create liability for half-truths, but the common law may not. 1d. at 1439.
11. Newton, supra note 2, at 167 n.4; see Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1241.42 (8th
Cir. 1970). The scope of pendent jurisdiction is uncertain after Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). Other fraud theories include common-law fraud and some causes of
action listed in note 7 supra.
12. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 480-81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F.
Supp. 396, 399 (N.D. Ill. 1977); 1976-77 Securities Law Developments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
863, 864 (1977); 15 Hous. L. REV. 415, 421 (1978) (reviewing Seventh Circuit opinion in Daniel v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 551 (1979)); 12
URn. L. ANN. 277, 286 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933), reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECuRrIEs EXCHANOE ACT OF
1934, item 18 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
13. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z
(1976)).
14. See I L. Loss, supra note 2, at 119-21.
15. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12(2), 15, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2), 77o, 77q (1976);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
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To invoke the statutory remedies, plaintiffs must first establish that
the subject of the suit is within the definition of "security" formulated
by Congress and courts. 16 The Securities Act and the Securities Ex-
change Act define "security" by similar lists of possible securities, in-
cluding "any . . . investment contract" or "instrument commonly
known as a 'security.' ",t7 The statutes do not specify the characteristics
of securities, nor do their legislative histories provide much guidance,
18
16. See note 2 supra.
17. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976):
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col-
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, in-
vestment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or in-
strument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976):
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other min-
eral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not
include currency or any note, draft, bill or exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace,
or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Although these definitions differ, the Supreme Court construes them together. Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967). Regulations promulgated under the statutes do not clarify
the definition of "security." See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.100-.656, 240.0-1 to 240.31-1 (1979).
18. Courts and commentators agree that Congress provided little guidance for identifying
securities. See United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 (1975) ("Congress did
not attempt to articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguishing 'securities' from 'non-
securities.' "); 1976-77 Securities Law Developments, supra note 12, at 864 ("The legislative history
of the acts similarly fails to define the intended scope of a security"). The legislative history states
that the Securities Act of 1933 "defines the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and general terms
so as to include within that definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial world
fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933),
reprinted in 2 LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 12, at item 18.
This history provides an indication about the statutes' applicability to real estate transactions,
although no case has presented a pertinent argument. As originally enacted, the Securities Act of
1933 included "certificate of interest in property, tangible or intangible" within the definition of
"security." Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l)
(1976)). That language does not appear in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976). Congress deleted the "property" clause "as possibly involving too
broad and uncertain application." H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1934), reprinted in
5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at item 20.
See also H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1933), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATiVE HISTORY, supra
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probably because Congress could not foresee those innovations which
might give rise to a need for *securities regulation protection.' 9
To determine whether a transaction constitutes a sale of a security,
therefore, courts rely on maxims of statutory construction and on pol-
icy-oriented analyses. Courts construe the statutes broadly20 in light of
their remedial purposes2 and disregard form for substance in evaluat-
ing the alleged security's economic realities.22 The courts thus have
moved from a literal approach, which required courts to find a security
whenever the instrument in question was known as a "security," re-
gardless of its other characteristics, to flexible formulae for identifying
and defining securities.' The most salient example of a court-devel-
oped formula is the definition of "investment contract." Securities in
real estate transactions have most often been investment contracts.24
note 12, at item 22 (security is defined as including a "beneficial interest in title to property"); H.R.
4500, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933), reprintedin 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at item 23
(security is defined in part by "evidence of a beneficial interest in title to property"); H.R. 5480,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at item 24
(security is defined in part as a "certificate of interest in property").
19. See Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1241 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd,
439 U.S. 551 (1979) ("Perhaps the main reason that pension plans are not specifically mentioned
in the legislative history ... is the fact that in the early 1930's pension plans were still a rarity.");
Comment, Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Noncontributory, Defined Benefit Pension
Plans, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 124, 126-27 (1977). But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 563-65 (1979) (use of legislative history contrary to the findings in Seventh Circuit
opinion); 27 CATH. L. REV. 364, 365 (1978) (some evidence of legislative intent to include pensions
as "securities").
20. See Tcherepnin v. Knight. 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344, 353-55 (1943); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 480-81 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D. In. 1977);
1976-77 Securities Law Developments, supra note 12, at 866.
21. Although the statutes create criminal liabilities, the remedial aim remains the "dominat-
ing purpose." SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353-55 (1943).
22. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); accord, International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
851-52 (1975).
23. See United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Forman noted that,
"[w]ith the exception of the Second Circuit, every Court of Appeals recently to consider the issue
has rejected the literal approach urged by respondents." Id. at 849 n.14. The Second Circuit
abandoned the literal approach in 1976. Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612, 616 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1009 (1976). See also Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d
1126, 1133 (2d Cir. 1976) ("courts have shrunk from a literal reading that would extend the reach
of the statutes beyond what could reasonably be thought to have been intended").
24. Real estate transactions that may constitute sales of securities include: (1) condomini-
ums: SEC v. Marasol Properties, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,159
(D.D.C. 1973); Lowery v. Ford Hill Inv. Co., 548 P.2d 127 (Colo. App.), rev'd on other grounds,
556 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1976); SEC Release No. 5347, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
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The "investment contract" definition evolved in a series of Supreme
Court decisions.25 In SEC v. C. Joiner Leasing Corp.,26 respondent
sold investment rights in an oil-drilling enterprise. The seller adver-
tised the rights as investments,27 but contended in court that because
the sales were of real estate interests, they were subject only to state
regulation.28 The Court, after observing that the sales "had all the evils
inherent in the securities transactions which it was the aim of the Se-
(CCH) T 79,163 (Jan. 4, 1973); Berman & Stone, Federal Securities Law andthe Sale of Condomini-
ums, Homes, andHomesites, 30 Bus. LAW. 411 (1975); Note, FederalSecurities Regulation of Con-
dominiums: 4 Purchaser's Perspective, 62 GEo. L.J. 1403 (1974). Contra, Joyce v. Ritchie Tower
Properties, 417 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Ill. 1976); (2) time-sharing condominiums: Gunnar, Regulations
of Resort Time-Sharing, 57 OR. L. REV. 31 (1977); Note, Securities: Another Way to Regulate the
Resort Development Boom, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 104 (1974). See also Joyce v. Ritchie Tower Proper-
ties, 417 F. Supp. 53, 56 (N.D. I11. 1976) (dictum); (3) cooperatives: Miller, Cooperative Apart-
ments. Real Estate or Securities?, 45 B.U.L. REV. 465 (1965); Note, Community 4partments
Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 299 (1962); Note, Cooperative Housing
Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 118 (1971); Note, Shares in
Privately Financed Cooperative Apartment Corporations and the Federal Securities Law after
Grenader v. Spitz, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 432 (1977). Contra, United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1009
(1976); (4) sales on installment contracts: Coffey & Welch, Federal Regulation of Land Sales Full
Disclosure Comes Down to Earth, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 5, 13 (1969). See also Nelson &
Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National Perspective, 1977 B.Y.U.L. REV. 541; (5)
management contracts: SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203
F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); SEC v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F.
Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962); SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1941). Contra, Schultz v.
Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1978); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912 (8th Cir.
1976); (6) real estate syndications: Davis, Developments in RealProperty Syndication, 39 TEX. B.J.
616 (1976); Greenwood, Syndication of UndevelopedReal Estate and Securities Law Implications, 9
Hous. L. REV. 53 (1971); (7) notes secured by realty mortgages: Hall v. Security Planning Serv.,
Inc., 371 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ariz. 1974); SEC v. Thunderbird Valley, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 184 (D.S.D.
1973); SEC v. Dell Inv. Co., No. CV-72-L-121 (D. Neb. June 5, 1972) (opinion printed at Hall v.
Security Planning Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. at 17-26 (app. I)); and (8) undivided interests in unde-
veloped land: Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Federal Shopping Way,
Inc., 433 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Great W. Land & Dev., Inc., [1964-1966 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,537 (D. Ariz. 1965), remanded on other grounds, 355 F.2d
918 (9th Cir. 1966).
25. Four Supreme Court cases analyze the investment contract issue: International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344 (1943). Forman, Howey, and Joiner involve real estate transactions.
The Court has considered the definition of "security" in only three other cases: Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). None of these cases involves a real estate
transaction.
26. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
27. Id. at 346.
28. Id. at 352.
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curities Act [of 1933] to end,"29 set forth a new test to determine the
applicability of the securities statute:
The test. . is what character the instrument is given in commerce by the
terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements
held out to the prospect. In the enforcement of an act such as this it is not
inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged as being what they were
represented to be.
30
Because the seller promoted the interests as securities, the Court held
that securities regulations applied.
31
Three years after Joiner, the Court substantially elaborated on its
view of investment contracts in SEC v. .J Howey Co. 32 Defendant in
Howey sold portions of an orange grove, retaining full rights to control
each parcel and to share in the grove's profits. 33 The Court held that
the land contracts, warranty deeds, and service contracts were invest-
ment contracts.34 For purposes of the Securities Act of 1933, the Court
suggested that an investment contract has four characteristics: (1) the
transaction must be an investment; (2) the investment must be in a
common enterprise; (3) the common enterprise must result in profits;
and (4) the profits must accrue solely from the efforts of others.35
Howey thus promulgated a flexible and objective test for identifying
investment contracts, "affording broad protection to investors ...
[un]thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae. 36
29. Id. at 349.
30. Id. at 352-53.
31. Id.
32. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
33. Id. at 294-97.
34. Id. at 297, 300.
35. Id. at 301. "The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a com-
mon enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." Id. In slightly different
language, the opinion also defined an investment contract as "a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." Id. at 298-99.
Many courts use the latter quotation in their opinions. Eg., Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d
1023, 1024 (10th Cir. 1978); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,109 (D.
Colo. 1976); Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Happy
Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 178 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Johnson v.
Suburban Land Inv. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,022 (D.C. Super.
Ct. 1973). The Supreme Court, however, relies on the former quotation. E.g., International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 852 (1975). This Note employs the former quotation.
36. 328 U.S. at 301.
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In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman37 and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,38 the Supreme Court narrowed the
scope of transactions that might be deemed "investment contracts"
under the Howey test. Forman limited "profits" within the meaning of
an investment contract to "either capital appreciation resulting from
the development of the initial investment. . . or participation in earn-
ings resulting from the use of investors' funds. ' 39 Because "neither of
the kinds of profits traditionally associated with securities was offered
to respondents," the shares of "stock" purchased from petitioner did
not constitute "securities" under the Securities Acts.40 The Forman
Court also held that the "stock" purchased by respondents did not con-
stitute an investment contract because respondents intended to acquire
subsidized, low-cost housing through their purchases, not to make a
profit.4 '
The Court in Daniel followed the Forman lead in these two respects.
Even if pension benefits could be described properly as "profits" re-
turned on an employee's investment in a noncontributory, compulsory
pension plan, they would depend not on the success of an investment,
but on the employee's ability to meet the vesting requirements. Thus,
any "profits" would not accrue solely from the efforts of others."2
Daniel also relied on the subjective intention of the investor for identi-
fying securities.4 3 Because the pension plan was a relatively insignifi-
37. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Comments on Forman appear at: 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 849; 26 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 735 (1976); 1 J. CORP. L. 639 (1976); 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 206 (1975); 22 N.Y.L.
Sc. L. REV. 132 (1976); 12 URB. L. ANN. 277 (1976).
38. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
39. 421 U.S. at 852.
40. Id. at 854.
41. Id. at 853, 858-60.
42. 439 U.S. at 561-62.
43. The subjective approach undermines the reliability of Howey or any other objective
formula for identifying securities. Professor Coffey advocates the use of an objective test for an-
other reason. An objective test should comprise the economic characteristics of securities that
create the need for special fraud remedies. That test should then apply to all alleged securities.
Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security" Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. REs.
L. REV. 367, 403-04 (1967).
Another commentator anticipated the subjective analysis that the Court soon adopted:
It is interesting that in more than 60 years of securities regulation in this country, we still
have no clearly accepted definition of a security. In this regard we are somewhat in the
same position as some of the members of the United States Supreme Court when dealing
with obscenity: We can generally tell a security when we see one, on a case by case basis,
but have been unwilling to attempt to give a generic definition to the term.
Long, Interpreting the Statutory Definition of a Security Some Pragmatic Considerations-Intro-
Number 4]
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cant part of an indivisible compensation package, an employee could
not perceive the plan-particularly a noncontributory, compulsory
plan-as an investment for the future.'
Despite these Court-imposed restrictions on Howey and the criti-
cisms by commentators45 of that case, the Howey test remains the start-
ing point for identification of investment contracts. 6 An explicit
variation from Howey replaces the "solely from the efforts of others"47
element with a less-stringent requirement. Seeking to preserve the an-
tifraud statutes' broad remedial purposes and flexibility,48 the Ninth
Circuit in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.4 9 stated a new test:
"whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the un-
deniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect
the failure or success of the enterprise. '50 Most circuits have followed
the Ninth Circuit's lead.5'
Fulfilling the statutes' remedial purposes and keeping the statutes
flexible enough to meet the imaginative schemes of fraudulent dealers
are decisive issues in courts' identification of securities. 2 Many courts
duction, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 96, 96 (1974); f Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (regarding hard-core pornography: "I know it when I see it").
44. 439 U.S. at 560.
45. One writer urged the abandonment of Howey and suggested that the Howey opinion
allows this change. Long, supra note 2, at 177 & n.177. He quotes from Howey: "The statutory
policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant
formulae." 328 U.S. at 301. See also Securities Regulation, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 815, 815; 26 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 735, 748-49 (1976).
46. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979).
47. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
48. See notes 12, 20-22, 36 supra and accompanying text.
49. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
50. Id. at 482.
We hold, however, that in light of the remedial nature of the legislation, the statutory
policy of affording broad protection to the public, and the Supreme Court's admonitions
that the definition of securities should be a flexible one, the word "solely" should not be
read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract, but rather
must be construed realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes
which involve in substance, if not form, securities.
Id See also Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976) (reaffirming the Turner test). For a
brief description of Turner and related theories, see Newton, supra note 2, at 192-95.
51. See Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976); MeCown v.
Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975) ("it has been widely held that this reliance of the
investor on the promoter need not be total"); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473,
477-78 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692-93 (3d Cir. 1973). The
Supreme Court has expressly reserved judgment on the Turner test. United Hous. Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975).
52. See Securities Regulation, supra note 45, at 815-16. But see Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F.
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find innovative means of satisfying some Howey elements when the
need to apply securities regulations arises. 3 Despite that flexibility, or-
dinary sales of land generally do not involve sales of securities. 4 Few
litigants characterize land as a security,55 and the facts of a land trans-
action rarely satisfy any of the Howey elements.5 6 One court acknowl-
edged, however, that "[alt a certain point, a simple real estate
transaction may be metamorphosed into an 'investment contract.' 57
Although the Supreme Court's definition of "investment contract" is
elaborate, the point at which a transaction can become a security re-
Supp. 396, 399-401 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (the securities laws must be flexible, but they should not be a
"catch-all").
53. See notes 47-51 supra and accompanying text. Many state courts rely on Howey when
construing state securities regulation statutes. An important variation of Howey in some states is
the "risk capital" theory, which allows courts to find a security if the investor risks part of the
capital needed to develop the enterprise. The leading "risk capital" cases include Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); State v. Hawaii
Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971). Professor Coffey developed an elaborate
"security" definition incorporating the "risk capital" theory. Coffey, supra note 43, at 377. See
generaly Newton, supra note 2, at 195-98 (brief description of "risk capital" theory). No court
has applied "risk capital" to analysis under federal securities regulations. See United Hous.
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.24 (1975); Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d
183, 185 (9th Cir. 1974); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo.
1970), ayt'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972). But see El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974) (may have adopted "risk capital"); Hunt, Madame El
Khadem, the Ninth Circuit, and the Risk CapitalApproach, 57 OR. L. REv. 3, 5, 11 (1977) (six states
in Ninth Circuit have adopted "risk capital"; El Khadem "possibly" adopted it); Note, Shares in
Pri'ateh Financed Cooperative Apartment Corporations and the Federal Securities Law after
Grenader v. Spitz, 30 RUTOERs L. REV. 432, 450-51 (1977).
54. See note 4 supra.
55. See United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Contract Buyers
League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969), a ffidsub nom. Baker v. F & F Inv., 420
F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970). See also Prohaska v. Hemmer-Miller Dev. Co., 256 I11. App. 331
(1930); Great W. Campers Ass'n, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 78,386
(Aug. 13, 1971) (SEC No-Action Letter).
56. See note 35 supra. In United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Cal. 1975), the
court held that the parties to the land transaction did not enter a common enterprise, that the
seller did not provide essential managerial efforts affecting the transaction's value, and that Con-
gress did not intend to bring commercial real estate transactions within the scope of securities
regulation protection. Id. at 314.
In Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969), ay'dsubnom. Baker
v. F & F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970), the court held that the sellers did not control the
property, that eventual capital gains were not "profits", that Congress did not intend to apply
securities regulations to installment contract land sales, and that even if securities regulations
applied, the statutes could not remedy any of the buyers' allegations. Id. at 224-25.
57. United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310, 313. (S.D. Cal. 1975).
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mains unclear. The cases applying that definition to sales of subdivi-
sion lots illustrate the definition's complexity.
II. SALES OF LOTS IN RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISIONS
Some buyers of subdivision lots have argued in recent years58 that
their land purchases were sales of securities. 59 Eleven cases have ana-
lyzed the argument under the federal statutes, 60 and the courts have
split on the issue. Only one case held that the sale involved a security;
6 t
four cases held to the contrary;62 and the remaining six cases did not
decide the issue, but left open the possibility for future litigation.
63
Most of the opinions began with the four-element Howey framework of
analysis for identifying an "investment contract."'
58. The first case on point was litigated in 1973. See note 5 supra. The subdivision cases
arise in the wake of increased investment by blue-collar and lower and middle income white-
collar workers after the Second World War. Long, supra note 2, at 135.
59. A few commentators speculated before the first case on point that sales of undeveloped
subdivision lots could be securities. Coffey & Welch, supra note 24, at 12; Greenwood, suvora note
24, at 73; Morris, supra note 7, at 335-36; Note, Regulating the Subdivided Land Market, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1528, 1538 (1968). One article studied the possibility following the first case on point.
Hannan & Thomas, supra note 2, at 274-77. A student Comment analyzed some of the earliest
cases on point. Comment, Recreational Land Subdivisions as. Investment Contract Securities, 13
Hous. L. REv. 153 (1975).
60. See note 5 supra.
61. See Johnson v. Suburban Land Inv. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,022 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973).
62. See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978); Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates,
Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F.
Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Bubula v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., No. 73 C 3131 (N.D. I11. June 27,
1974).
63. These cases denied the defendants' motions either for summary judgment or to dismiss
the plaintiffs' complaints: McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975); Fogel v. Sellamer-
ica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill.
1977); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,109
(D. Colo. 1976); Hester v. Hidden Valley Lakes, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Ander-
son v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 11. App. 3d 687, 384 N.E.2d 981 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
272 (1979).
64. See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1024 (10th Cir. 1978); McCown v. Heidler,
527 F.2d 204, 208 (10th Cir. 1975); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 400 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp.,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,109, at 91,988 (D. Colo. 1976); Davis
v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Happy Inv. Group v.
Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 178 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Bubula v. Grand Bahama
Dev. Co., No. 73 C 3131, slip op. at 3 (N.D. III. June 27, 1974); Johnson v. Suburban Land Inv.
Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 94,022, at 94,104 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973);
Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 Il. App. 3d 687, 691, 384 N.E.2d 981, 984 (1978), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
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A. Investment
The first element of the Howey test 65 requires a finding that the pur-
chaser of a subdivision lot made an "investment."66 Although the pur-
chaser of stock clearly intends to make an investment, the buyer of
residential property may be seeking only a residence.67 The distinction
between these transactions is the commercial-investment dichotomy.68
A commercial transaction cannot involve a security, but an investment
can. Two criteria in the residential subdivision cases determine
whether the sale is on the "investment" or the "commercial" side of the
dichotomy: the buyer's motive for purchasing the land and the seller's
emphasis when promoting the subdivision.69
The "investment" criteria appear in most of the subdivision lot cases.
Six of the eleven subdivision cases used both criteria.7" One case ex-
amined only the buyer's motive,7' and one case relied solely on the
promoter's emphasis.72  These analyses conform to Supreme Court
holdings. The Joiner73 Court held that "it is not inappropriate that
promoters' offerings be judged as being what they were represented to
be."'74 The subdivision cases accordingly examined the actions of sell-
ers to determine whether they promoted the lots as investments or as
places of residence for buyers.75 Courts can satisfy the first element of
65. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-53 (1975); SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 402 (N.D. Ili. 1977).
68. The commercial-investment dichotomy developed in cases that decided whether certain
notes were securities. See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d
Cir. 1976); Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d 38, 40 (7th Cir. 1976); C.N.S. Enterprises,
Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359-62 (7th Cir. 1975); McClure v. First Nat'l
Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1974).
69. See notes 70-92 infra and accompanying text.
70. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd.,
445 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 400-02 (N.D. I11.
1977); Hester v. Hidden Valley Lakes, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 580, 584 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Davis v. Rio
Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1049-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Anderson v. Grand Bahama
Dev. Co., 67 IlI. App. 3d 687, 692-93, 384 N.E.2d 981, 984-85 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272
(1979).
71. See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978).
72. See Johnson v. Suburban Land Inv. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,022, at 94,102 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973).
73. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). See notes 25-30 supra and ac-
companying text.
74. 320 U.S. at 353. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text.
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Howey if they find that the sellers represented the land as an invest-
ment.
Courts use a variety of evidence to decide whether the promoter em-
phasized "investment" or "commercial" purposes in the sale of lots.
They most frequently examine the seller's promotional materials:
brochures, 7 6 advertisements,77 and other literature.78 Courts, however,
have found "investment" or "commercial" emphasis in seminars for
sellers79 or the public, 0 instructions to salesmen,," maps,82 oral repre-
sentations to buyers,8 3 and even a General Form for Registration of
Securities filed with the SEC. 4 Most courts consider the seller's em-
phasis in conjunction with the buyer's motive for purchasing the land.8"
That motive also can be "investment" or "commercial."
Analysis of the buyer's motive is compatible with Supreme Court
holdings. The Court, in its "subjective" approach,8 6 did not find a se-
76. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 210 (10th Cir. 1975); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd.,
445 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 400-01 (N.D. I11.
1977); Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
77. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 210 (10th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Suburban Land
Inv. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,022, at 94,102 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1973); Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 687, 692-93, 384 N.E.2d 981, 984-85
(1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
78. See Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Timmreck v.
Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 400-01 (N.D. IUl. 1977); Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp.
1045, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 687, 692-93,
384 N.E.2d 981, 984-85 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
79. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 209-10 (10th Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 210. See Johnson v. Suburban Land Inv. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,022, at 94,102 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973).
81. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 210 (10th Cir. 1975).
82. See Tinmmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 400-01 (N.D. 111. 1977).
83. See id. The contracts for sales of the lots, however, disclaimed any representations or
warranties not in the contracts. Id. at 400. The Timmreck court concluded: "Possibly such a
clause might be enforceable under contract law despite its clear nature as an adhesion clause. But
this language must be disregarded for securities law analysis. This is particularly true where the
boilerplate is likely to prove palpably false." Id. at 401. The Timmreck court found through its
own investigation that the contract for the sale of property in McCown contained a clause dis-
claiming any "understanding or agreement between the parties except as expressly set forth or
made a part hereof." Id. at 401 & n.1. That clause, however, was not at issue in McCown. Con-
ira, Bubula v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., No. 73 C 3131, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ili. June 27, 1974):
"Alleged oral misrepresentations cannot transform a document into a security to bring it within
the jurisdiction of this court if the document itself does not satisfy the definition of the statute and
the case law."
84. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 210 (10th Cir. 1975).
85. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
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curity in Forman8 7 or DanieP88 because the litigants did not view their
transactions as purchases of securities.89 By examining the buyer's mo-
tive, lower courts in the subdivision cases adhere to the Forman-Daniel
subjective approach. The general rule characterizes the motive as in-
vestment-oriented if the buyer claims to have purchased the lots as in-
vestments rather than as places of residence.9" A few courts look to
other evidence of the buyer's investment motives, including the seller's
promotional materials9 and whether the buyer paid more than the
land's market value.92
Subjective analysis can create inconsistencies in securities analysis.
If two parties purchase identical lots under identical terms, but only
one buyer perceives the purchase as an investment, only that buyer
may have a cause of action under the securities statutes. McCown v.
Heidler93 demonstrates the inconsistency. Many buyers in McCown
had an investment motive, because 108 of the 262 lot owners in the
subdivision did not expect to reside on their lots. 94 Some buyers, there-
fore, had fulfilled the "investment" element of Howey; "[tihat other lot
purchasers may be interested solely in obtaining a site on which to
build their home merely indicates the duality of this 'invest-
ment/ownership package.'95
87. United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
88. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
89. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978); McCown v. Heidler,
527 F.2d 204, 210-11 (10th Cir. 1975); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1277
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 402 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Hester v. Hidden
Valley Estates, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 580, 584 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc.,
401 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d
687, 692-93, 384 N.E.2d 981, 984-85 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
91. See Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 402-03 (N.D. I11. 1977); Davis v. Rio Rancho
Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1049-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally 9 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 206,
221 n.62 (1975) (regarding Darig "the court also emphasized the importance of the promoters'
advertising brochures as the primary indication of the purchaser's intent").
92. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F.
Supp. 396, 403-04 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
93. 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
94. Id. at 210.
95. Id. at 211. One commentator observed:
The McCown court apparently subscribes to the notion that a dual motivation of con-
sumption and profit expectation does not preclude the existence of a security. Consider-
ing that the criteria for gauging the existence of a security are the terms of the offer in
light of the investor's reasonable expectations of profit, a bifurcation of the McCown
transaction to hold that some investors purchased a security would be inappropriate.
Newton, supra note 2, at 189 n.147 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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After deciding whether the promoter's emphasis and the buyer's mo-
tive have an "investment" or "commercial" character, courts examine
both of these factors in conjunction with one another.96 Plaintiffs can
easily establish the "investment" element if the buyer and seller are on
the investment side of the commercial-investment dichotomy, but if ei-
ther party commingles "commercial" and "investment" reasons for ex-
ecuting the sale, proof is more difficult. If the transaction contains
features on both sides of the dichotomy, the predominant side con-
trols.97 If litigants cannot prove that the sale's character is predomi-
nately "investment" or "commercial," the general rule that real estate is
not a security98 may compel courts to rule against plaintiffs' securities
claims.
Despite the inconsistencies99 and complexities' 00 in analyzing the
buyer's motive and the seller's emphasis, these tests isolate proper con-
ditions for identifying securities. Security owners use securities prima-
rily to generate income.' 0' The lot owner seeking only an investment
uses the land primarily for income purposes; thus, the land is similar to
a security. The owner residing on the lot uses that alleged security for a
principal purpose other than income generation; the property, there-
96. See notes 69, 85 supra and accompanying text.
97. See Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 403 n.4 (N.D. I11. 1977); Davis v. Rio Rancho
Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Only Timmreck and Davis allude to the
"predominant" test; neither case clearly states the rule. The buyers in Timreck argued that they
intended to make an investment, but the court held that "[o]ther factors, such as any emphasis
given to Candlewick [the subdivision] as a desirable place for the purchasers to spend their time,
of course, may counterbalance such representations." 433 F. Supp. at 403 n.4 (emphasis in origi-
nal). The buyers in Davis argued that the seller emphasized an investment, and the sellers argued
that they advertised only residential property. The court examined the promotional literature and
concluded that, "[a]lthough the two themes are interwoven throughout the brochures, defendants'
promotional materials, fairly read, place more emphasis on development of a residential commu-
nity than on purchase as an investment." 401 F. Supp. at 1049.
But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979) ("Even in those
cases where the interest acquired had intermingled security and non-security aspects, the interest
obtained had 'to a very substantial degree elements of investment contracts. . . .' "); SEC v. Vari-
able Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 91 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("while these contracts
contain insurance features, they contain to a very substantial degree elements of investment con-
tracts").
98. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 93-95 supra and accompanying text.
100. Contra, Comment, supra note 59, at 164 ("The Howey test's first requirement of an in-
vestment of money requires almost no comment .... By whatever means the lots are sold, there
is always present the element of an investment of money.").
101. Seegenerally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 157 (2d ed. 1970);
18 CJ.S. Corporations § 194 (1939)
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fore, is not like a security.'0 2 The buyer's intentions alone, however,
should not render the seller liable under securities regulations. If the
seller emphasizes a sale with all the characteristics of a security, the
seller can reasonably expect to incur-and should incur-extraordinary
liabilities.'I 3
B. Common Enterprise
If the buyer has made an investment,'" the Howey test requires the
buyer to make the investment in a common enterprise.'0 5 Courts that
explicitly find a common enterprise under Howey usually confront one
of two situations: a pooling of funds provided by investors,0 6 or inves-
tors' dependence on promoters for the success of the common enter-
prise.10 7 Seven' 08 of the eleven subdivision cases'0 9 analyzed the
"common enterprise" component of Howey in terms of these two situa-
tions.
Of the four cases that used the pooling concept, 0 three cases found
102. The Supreme Court has held that the owner's perception of the alleged security is rele-
vant to the definitional analysis. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
103. The Supreme Court has held that the seller's characterization of the alleged security is
relevant to the definitional analysis. See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 65-103 supra and accompanying text.
105. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
106. See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1977) (common enter-
prise comprises multiple investors and pooling of funds); Milnark v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457
F.2d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 1972) ("pooling of funds for a common purpose"). But see SEC v. Conti-
nental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974) (pooling is not essential).
107. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1974); Glen-Arden
Commodities v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027, 1034-35 (2d Cir. 1974); Continental Marketing Corp.
v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968); Los Angeles Trust
Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 168 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961);
Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Mitzer v. Cardet Int'l,
Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (N.D. II. 1973). See also Newton, supra note 2, at 176-81 (agency
theory analogy).
108. McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F.
Supp. 1269, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 403-04 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,109, at
91,998-99 (D. Colo. 1976); Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Bubula v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., No. 73 C 3131, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1974);
Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 687, 693, 384 N.E.2d 981, 985 (1978), cer.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
109. See note 5 supra.
110. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F.
Supp. 396, 403-04 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,109, at 91,998-99 (D. Colo. 1976); Bubula v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co.,
No. 73 C 3131, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1974).
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a pool of funds equivalent to the price paid for the property less its fair
market value at the time of sale. 1 ' Because the developers were to use
the excess cost to improve the subdivision," 2 the "utilization of
purchase money accumulated ...[brought] the scheme within the
'common enterprise' definition."' 13
The fourth pooling case, Bubula v. Grand Bahama Development
Co.," 4 involved a clear example of pooling. The purchase agreement
in Bubula required lot owners to pay "a relatively small annual 'serv-
ice' charge" for ninety-nine years to finance improvements." 5 The
court, however, did not find a common enterprise."l 6 The court's re-
fusal to find a common enterprise from this obvious form of pooling is
unusual in view of the less-obvious pooling in the other cases." 7 More-
over, an Illinois appellate court, in Anderson v. Grand Bahama Develop-
ment Co.,"' had little difficulty finding a common enterprise in a case
"arising out of the same facts" as Bubula,"9 although it used the de-
pendency concept 20 to find a common enterprise. 2'
Three subdivision lot cases, including Anderson, employed the de-
pendency concept in common enterprise analyses.' 22 The dependency
theory requires that the developer be obligated to improve the area af-
ter the sale of lots and that the buyers actually depend on the devel-
111. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F.
Supp. 396, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 96,109, at 91,998-99 (D. Colo. 1976).
112. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F.
Supp. 396, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,109, at 91,998-99 (D. Colo. 1976).
113. McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975). The same language appears in
Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 403-04 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,109, at 99,998-99 (D. Colo. 1976).
114. No. 73 C 3131 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1974).
115. Id., slip op. at 3-4. The court dismissed the contention that this case involved a common
enterprise on the unsound reasoning that the service-charge requirement "does not give the pur-
chasers any interest in property other than their own lots and does not provide them with the
chance of future profits 'solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.'" Id.
116. Id., slip op. at 3.
117. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
118. 67 Ill. App. 3d 687, 384 N.E.2d 981 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
119. Id. at 692, 384 N.E.2d at 984.
120. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
121. "[Plaintiffs'] fortunes are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts of defendants."
67 Ill. App. 3d at 693, 384 N.E.2d at 985.
122. See Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Davis v. Rio
Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev.
Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 687, 693, 384 N.E.2d 981, 985 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
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oper's fulfillment of those obligations for a successful investment.'23
The seller's obligations can be part of an express 24 or implied con-
tract, 25 but courts are also willing to find the obligations in implied or
oral representations. 126
C. Profits
The "profits" component of the Howey test 27 is the most difficult of
the four elements to define. Forman 128 narrowly defines profits as capi-
tal appreciation from the initial investment or receipt of earnings from
investors' funds.' 29 Forman adds that the prospect of receiving the
"profits" must attract the investor.' 30
123. See notes 107, 122 supra.
124. See Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (10th Cir. 1978); Davis v. Rio
Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev.
Co., 67 111. App. 3d 687, 693, 384 N.E.2d 981, 985 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
125. See Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (10th Cir. 1978); Anderson v.
Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 111. App. 3d 687, 693, 384 N.E.2d 981, 985 (1978). But see Davis v.
Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court apparently requires
written contracts).
126. See Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1277-78 (10th Cir. 1978) (investment
issue cannot be decided without first considering promotional representations); Anderson v.
Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 687, 693, 384 N.E.2d 981, 985 (1978) (obligations of
developer found in seller's "promotional materials and utterances"), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272
(1979). But see Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court
apparently requires written contracts).
127. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
128. United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
129. Id. at 852. Forman states further that any "capital appreciation" must be similar to the
profits in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), in which the investors' funds
were used to finance the promoter's plans; moreover, any "participation in earnings" must be
similar to the profits in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), in which dividends were based
on the promoter's profits. See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text. The Forman Court
implied that capital appreciation incurred on the same parcel of residential real estate could be
"profits," but that state law prohibited gains on the sale of the cooperative housing in question.
421 U.S. at 854.
Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1975), held, only
one month before the Supreme Court decided Forman, that capital gains from sales of subdivision
lots are not "profits," because "at no time until sale of the land will plaintiffs realize any actual
monetary profit." Id. at 180 (emphasis in original). Happy distinguished those "profits" from the
annual payments in Howey, the tenants' possible rent reductions in 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakob-
son, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974), and the landlord's possible rent increases in Huberman v.
Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 396 F. Supp. at 180. See Tim-
mreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 402 n.3 (N.D. IU. 1977); 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 206, 221 n.62
(1975). But see Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612, 619 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1009 (1976)
(overruling Jakobson).
130. "Tlhe investor is 'attracted solely by the prospects of a return' on his investment." 421
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Eight' of the eleven subdivision cases 132 analyzed "profits." The
alleged profit in each case was increased land values resulting from the
seller's improvements in the subdivision,133 but only one of these cases
explicitly held that the capital appreciation could constitute "prof-
its." 134 The remaining cases examined the alleged profits in the context
of other Howey-test elements, and held that capital appreciation must
come from either a common enterprise 135 or the efforts of others to be
considered "profits."' 136
The subdivision lot cases thus restrict severely the "profits" con-
cept 137 and fail to give "profits" an independent definition. 138  The
courts' distinction between the capital appreciation of these lots and the
capital appreciation that all real estate buyers expect to accrue appar-
U.S. at 852 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946)). Probably no court would
strictly construe the word "solely" in this test. See notes 47-51 supra and accompanying text.
131. See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1978); McCown v. Heidler,
527 F.2d 204, 209 (10th Cir. 1975); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 400 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp.,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,109, at 91,998 (D. Colo. 1976); Davis
v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bubula v. Grand Bahama
Dev. Co., No. 73 C 3131, slip op. at 4-5 (N.D. IIl. June 27, 1974); Anderson v. Grand Bahama
Dev. Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 687, 694, 384 N.E.2d 981, 985 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
132. See note 5 supra.
133. See note 131 supra.
134. See Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 687, 694, 384 N.E.2d 981, 985
(1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
135. See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1978); Davis v. Rio Rancho
Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bubula v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., No. 73
C 3131, slip op. at 3 (N.D. IlL. June 27, 1974). Bubula required the capital appreciation to result
from an undefined type of common enterprise:
We do not doubt that they were led to expect that their investment could appreciate in
value and that much of this would be due to the efforts of the developers (using plaintiffs'
money to some extent). However, this is a far cry from a common enterprise in the sense
of Securities & Exchange Cammission v. Glen [sic] W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d
476 (9th Cir. 1973) ....
Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).
136. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd.,
445 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 400 (N.D. Ill.
1977); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
96,109, at 91,998-99 (D. Colo. 1976). Plaintiffs in McCwn, Timmreck, and Miller alleged that the
price paid for the land exceeded the property's market value. The alleged "profits" in each case
were increases in land values until the market value equaled the price paid. These "profits" ex-
ceed normal real estate appreciation and could result only from the efforts of the promoters. Mc-
Cown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d at 209, 211; Tinunreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. at 400, 403; Miller v.
Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,109, at 91,998-99.
137. See notes 128-30 supra and accompanying text.
138. See notes 135-36 supra and accompanying text.
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ently represents an attempt to obstruct every possibility that ordinary
real estate sales can be metamorphosed into sales of securities.'39 Anal-
ysis of "profits" only in the context of the other Howey-test elements,140
however, prevents a systematic application of the standard to the facts
of each case.
D. Solely from the Efforts of Others
Howey requires that profits from a security result "solely from the
efforts of others."' 4' Despite that stringent language, lower courts de-
mand only that the promoter's efforts be the "undeniably significant
ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or suc-
cess of the enterprise."'' 42  Many of the residential subdivision cases
measure the seller's obligations against this more lenient standard 43 set
forth in SEC v. Glenn W Turner Enterprises, Inc. 'I These obligations
range from routine improvements such as roads and sewers to con-
struction of extraordinary facilities such as golf courses and lakes. 45
139. These courts may also be avoiding the difficulty of identifying and evaluating the vari-
eties of capital appreciation. These varieties include: normal appreciation of most real estate;
appreciation resulting from improvements in the subdivision; and appreciation resulting from the
improvement of neighboring property. See Opinion of the Attorney General of Hawaii, [1961-
1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 70,882 (Oct. 15, 1970).
140. See notes 135-36 supra and accompanying text.
141. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
142. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
143. See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978); McCown v. Heidler,
527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 404 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,109, at
91,999 (D. Colo. 1976); Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 178
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
144. 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See notes 51-55 supra and
accompanying text.
145. See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978) ("shopping centers,
health and cultural facilities, transportation facilities, and abundant recreational opportunity, in-
cluding a golf course and lake"); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 209 (10th Cir. 1975) ("country
club, an 18-hole championship golf course, stables, equestrian center, tennis courts, clubhouses
and swimming pools"); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
("swimming and other recreational facilities and provide paved roads and bus service"); Tim-
mreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 403 n.4 (N.D. I11. 1977) ("snowmobile trails, four sand beaches,
. . . Olympic size swimming pool"); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,109, at 91,997 (D. Colo. 1976) ("publication of a newspaper for
property owners; availability of ski, golf, boat, tennis and similar facilities for property owners;
construction. . . of the base lodge, a country club, and a proposed lake, gas and telephone serv-
ices; and construction and maintenance of roads"); Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F.
Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("roads and other improvements"); Happy Inv. Group v.
Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 179 (N.D. Cal. 1975) ("roads and utilities"); Bubula
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In their analyses of the promoters' efforts, the subdivision cases146
examined either the extent of the promoters' duties' 47 or the impact of
those duties on land values. 148 Cases reviewing the extent of the pro-
moter's efforts 149 establish a general rule that the promoters' duties
must be more than "[m]inimal managerial services,"' 150 and that "usual
improvements, such as culinary water, underground sewage, curb, gut-
ter, and the like" are not sufficient obligations to meet this element of
the Howey test."5 ' The developers' efforts must be "undeniably signifi-
cant" or "essential" to fulfill the Turner 52 modification of Howey. The
test is easily satisfied when the promoter has the exclusive right to de-
velop the subdivision.' 53
The second method of fulfilling the Howey test's fourth element is to
prove that the promoter's duties will increase land values.'5 4 Plaintiffs
in nine 155 of the eleven subdivision cases 56 argued that the seller's obli-
v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., No. 73 C 3131, slip op. at 3 (N.D. I11. June 27, 1974) ("making and
maintaining common utilities and other improvements"); Johnson v. Suburban Land Inv. Co.,
[1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 194,022, at 94,102 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973) ("utili-
ties, roadways, recreational facilities, etc."); Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 I11. App. 3d
687, 690, 384 N.E.2d 981, 983 (1978) ("construction of facilities desirable for a complete commu-
nity, including roads, utilities, schools, recreational facilities, parks, greenways, churches, water-
ways, water reserves, beaches, marinas, golf courses, shopping complexes, and resort hotels"), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
146. See note 5 supra.
147. See notes 149-58 infra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 154-58 infra and accompanying text.
149. Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F.
Supp. 396, 403 & n.4 (N.D. Il. 1977); Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 687, 694, 384 N.E.2d 981,
985 (1978), cer. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
150. Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 403 n.4 (N.D. I. 1977). Timmreck uses both
means of analyzing the promoter's efforts. Those efforts must extensively develop and improve
the subdivision, id. at 403, and "substantially increase the value of the individual lots," id. at 400.
See notes 154-58 infra and accompanying text.
151. Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978).
152. See notes 50-51, 141-44 supra and accompanying text.
153. See Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Johnson v.
Suburban Land Inv. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,022, at 94,105
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1973); Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 IlM. App. 3d 687, 690, 694, 384
N.E.2d 981, 983, 985 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
154. See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
155. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 209 (10th Cir. 1975); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd.,
445 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Tinunreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 400 (N.D. 111.
1977); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rap. (CCH) 1
96,109, at 91,998-99 (D. Colo. 1976); Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1049
(S.DN.Y. 1975); Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D.
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gations to make improvements or to maintain the property were essen-
tial to create profits in the form of increased property values. The most
successful argument arose when plaintiffs alleged that the price paid for
the land exceeded the land's market value; thus, the promoters' efforts
were essential to increase land values until the market value matched
the price paid. 57 As long as the purchase price exceeded the market
value, the buyers risked a loss. If the market value were at least as
great as the purchase price, the investors could sell the land to recover
their investment. 58
The cases reveal two means of establishing that the promoter should
provide "essential" efforts, 159 but regardless of the means used, the
plaintiff must show the source of the promoter's obligations. The gen-
eral rule is that those duties must be contractual. 60  The purchaser's
case is strongest when a written contract stipulates the duties,16 ' but
some cases hold that implied offers 62 or oral representations163--or
even "utterances"' -may establish the promoter's responsibility.
Cal. 1975); Bubula v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., No. 73 C 3131, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ill. June 27,
1974); Johnson v. Suburban Land Inv. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,022, at 94,101 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973); Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d
687, 690-91, 694, 384 N.E.2d 981, 983, 985 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
156. See note 5 supra.
157. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 209 (10th Cir. 1975); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F.
Supp. 396, 400 (N.D. I11. 1977); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96, 109, at 9 1,998-99 (D. Colo. 1976); Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co.,
67 Ill. App. 3d 687, 690-91, 694, 384 N.E.2d 981, 983, 985 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272
(1979).
158. The court in Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
employed a peculiar requirement. The court held that the developer's obligations must result in a
distribution of profits other than eventual capital appreciation. Most courts hold that capital ap-
preciation is a proper manifestation of the developer's obligations. See, e.g., cases cited note 157
supra. One commentator observed that, "Though the analysis in Davis may be suspect, it is nev-
ertheless possible that the court reached the correct result." Newton, supra note 2, at 190.
159. See notes 147-48 supra and accompanying text.
160. See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025, 1027 (10th Cir. 1978); Davis v. Rio
Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld
Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 179 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
161. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 209 (10th Cir. 1975).
162. See Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. In. 1977). See also 1 L. Loss, supra
note 2, at 491-92.
163. See Tirnmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 400 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Miller v. Woodmoor
Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 5 96,109, at 91,997 (D. Colo. 1976);
Bubula v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., No. 73 C 3131, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Il. June 27, 1974); Ander-
son v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 II1. App. 3d 687, 692-93, 384 N.E.2d 981, 984-85 (1978), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
164. See Anderson v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 67 Il. App. 3d 687, 693, 384 N.E.2d 981, 985
(1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
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The seller's obligations must also be clear and certain. 6 5 Happy In-
vestment Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc.16 6 best illustrates this re-
quirement. Defendants "offered no concrete programs" and
"presented no substantive plans"; 67 they only "created the illusion that
the subdivision would develop primarily through their managerial ef-
forts."' 68 The court thus concluded that sales of these subdivision lots
did not constitute sales of securities, because the seller had not made
"actual commitments to perform specific services."' 169
These cases reveal the complexity of the requirement that profits de-
rive "solely from the efforts of others."' 70 Nevertheless, they suggest
three prerequisites: first, the promoter's duties must be more than
"minimal," or they must increase property values;t7t second, the duties
generally must be contractual; 72 and third, the developer's duties must
be specific rather than general sales-talk promises.' 73 Proving these
points can satisfy the final element of the Howey definition of "invest-
ment contract." 'v
4
165. See Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 403 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Happy Inv. Group v.
Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 180-81 (N.D. Cal. 1975). See also Newton, supra
note 2, at 189-90.
166. 396 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
167. Id. at 180.
168. Id. at 181 (emphasis in original).
169. Id. at 180-81. "A court must distinguish between mere puffery, generalizations, and other
talk designed to create an 'illusion' of extensive development plans, from cases where the real
burden of development is not placed upon the purchasers." Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396,
403 n.4 (N.D. I1. 1977). See also Newton, supra note 2, at 189. "If the promoters in McCown had
couched their sales literature and contractual arrangements in general terms rather than spelling
out specific, concrete services to be provided, the existence of a security arguably could have been
avoided." Id.
170. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
171. See notes 147-58 supra and accompanying text.
172. See notes 160-64 supra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 165-69 upra and accompanying text.
174. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. Beyond disproving these three points, defend-
ants may defend on two other grounds. First, although the developer may have "essential" duties,
the purchaser's reponsibilities for the development's success may greatly exceed the developer's
obligations. See Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 181 (N.D.
Cal. 1975). See also Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 403 n.4 (N.D. Il. 1977). Second,
although the developer's representations and duties may be specific, the developer has not created
a security if the representations are puffery. See id. See also Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc.,
401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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III. CONCLUSION: THE EMERGING FORMULA
Recurring throughout this analysis of the Howey test 175 is the pre-
dominant difficulty of separating the Howey elements to give them in-
dependent meaning. 176 The subdivision lot cases are not as clear and
structured as a standard analysis can provide. Although most of the
cases examined each Howe)' element, the specific grounds for the
courts' decisions are often vague. Nevertheless, the consistency of
methods among the cases establishes a formula for determining
whether a lot is a security. The following paragraphs discern those
methods of fulfilling each Howey component.
"Investment": The buyer's purposes and the seller's emphasis
demonstrate whether the transaction has an "investment" or "commer-
cial" character. If the transaction is on both sides of the commercial-
investment dichotomy, the predominant character prevails. 77
"Common Enterprise": Either the pooling theory or the dependency
theory of common enterprises is applicable to analyses of lot sales.
Buyers must pool funds for improvements or depend on the developer's
obligations for the subdivision's success.
178
"Profits": The buyer's profits can be anticipated capital apprecia-
tion, but the capital appreciation must generally result from the com-
mon enterprise or from the developer's efforts.' 7 9
"Solelyfrom the Efforts of Others": The promoter must assume defi-
nite obligations, as set forth in a contract with the purchaser or in rep-
resentations made to the purchaser, to perform the undeniably essential
managerial efforts that affect the failure or success of the enterprise or
that are necessary to increase land values until the value equals the
purchase price of the land.' 80
The foregoing analysis serves four important purposes. First, it
shows that many of the cases deal with consistent fact patterns. Sec-
ond, it demonstrates that these facts permit a consistent analysis of the
definitional issue. Third, it provides a framework for maintaining or
175. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
176. For example, most opinions in the subdivision lots cases do not clearly separate the
"profits" component from either the "common enterprise" component or the "solely from the
efforts of others" component. See notes 127-40 supra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 65-103 supra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 104-26 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 129-32 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 141-74 supra and accompanying text.
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enhancing consistent analyses in future judicial decisions. Last, it iso-
lates those facts that future litigants must either prove or disprove in
similar cases.
The securities statutes apply to sales of subdivision lots not only be-
cause the facts may satisfy the Howey test, but also because policy con-
siderations create a need for protection through securities
regulations.' The buyer who never intends to live on the lot 8 2 per-
ceives little difference between owning the lot and owning stock in a
corporation that. intends to develop the subdivision. In either situation,
the buyer entrusts the developer with the investment and profits only
on the sale of lots following the completed improvements. Just as the
shareholder receives either dividends after the developer sells lots or
capital gains when the corporation repurchases stock with profits real-
ized from selling lots, the lot purchaser realizes a gain on the sale of the
lot.' 83 The shares are securities,8 4 and the developer should not be
able to circumvent securities regulation by substituting lots for
shares.18 5
Securities regulations can reach sales of lots in residential subdivi-
sions if the facts satisfy the requirements of the Howey test.'8 6 Imagi-
181. Courts frequently rely on policy considerations when deciding whether federal securities
regulations apply to the subjects of law suits. See notes 20-22, 29, 52 supra and accompanying
text.
182. See notes 86-103 supra and accompanying text.
183. The tax consequences of these alternative arrangements, however, can make an impor-
tant difference to investors. Proceeds from sales of lots by lot owners, for example, generally are
ordinary income for income tax purposes under I.R.C. § 61(a)(3), but the proceeds can receive
favorable capital gains treatment if the owners hold the property for more than one year pursuant
to I.R.C. §§ 1202, 1222(3), 1222(11). Dividends receive ordinary income treatment under I.R.C.
§ 61(a)(7) as do proceeds from stock redemptions under I.R.C. § 302(a), although redemption
proceeds can receive capital gains treatment under circumstances specified in I.R.C. § 302(b), See
generally B. BITTKER & J. EusTiCE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS (4th ed. 1979). The Supreme Court in United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 855 (1975), implied that the tax advantages of investment plans are not relevant for
identification of securities.
184. See note 17 supra.
185. See generally Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.), cerl. denied, 323 U.S. 768
(1944) (whiskey warehouse receipts as securities). The Penfield court held:
The term "investment contract" particularly, which appears in thirty of the state acts, has
been construed in a long line of cases, both federal and state, as affording the investing
public a full measure of protection, whether the transaction takes one of the more nor-
mal forms of a security or whether instead the promoter clothes it with the appearance of
a transaction in some species of real or personal property.
Id. at 750.
186. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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native sellers may find new land-sale schemes," 7 but flexible securities
regulations can still encompass those transactions. 88 Although the
Supreme Court is narrowing the "security" definition, 8 9 lower courts,
while adhering to the Court's decisions, continue to bring within the
statutes' scope new types of transactions for which securities regulation
protection is needed.
Kenneth D. Crews
187. "For years the real estate industry has played host to some of the most outrageous charla-
tans in the annals of American swindling." Hannan & Thomas, supra note 2, at 274. Despite
innovations in sales arrangements, many basic aspects of subdivision lot sales will continue. For
an outline of real estate sales techniques and development activities that the federal government
should regulate, see Case & Jester, supra note 7, at 401-06.
188. See notes 61, 63 supra and accompanying text.
189. See notes 37-43 supra and accompanying text.
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